Today, everyone can watch the revolution happen in real time. Even if there are no CNN or other well-equipped television operators on site. The Telegram channels so popular in the former USSR serve this purpose. I, too, am happy to take this opportunity to watch how the revolutionary situation in Kyrgyzstan is developing at the rate of a wildfire.
On Monday, after the announcement of the results of the Kyrgyzstan parliamentary elections, dissatisfied people began to gather on the streets of Bishkek, the country's capital, and the parliamentary and presidential administration buildings were occupied later that evening. At night, a fire truck gutted the gates of the investigative isolator and released former President Almazbex Atambayev from imprisonment.
All this could be seen on the same Telegram channel Nexta, which broadcast Belarusian protests following the pseudo-elections of the President of Belarus on 9 August. Technically, this means that any witness of events captures what is happening with their mobile phone, sends it to Nexta, and there the operator on duty selects the most important ones from these submitted videos, which are distributed on the channel. Nexta currently has just over two million followers, the size of a relatively decent television audience.
So what happened in Kyrgyzstan? Parliamentary elections were held there on Sunday, in which 16 parties participated. The barrier to entry was 7%. Out of 16 parties, four parties overcame this barrier. Three relatively “authority” parties led by Birimdik (Unity) (24.9%) and one opposition party, Butun Kyrgyzstan (United Kyrgyzstan), which won 7.25% of the vote. The other twelve parties did not appear in parliament, and the existing government seemed to have "convincingly won". These words must be put in quotation marks, because the "victory" in the election, although not as unquestionably fabricated as in Belarus, did not correspond to the prevailing mood in society. As a result, mass protests broke out, which, unlike in Belarus, were organized quite openly by the opposition.
It is important to note here that in Kyrgyzstan, the opposition does not differ as much due to political and ideological differences but are more determined by the political and economic interests of individual clans. Consequently, each clan has a broad core of activists to use in such mass protests. Broadly speaking, it is a struggle between Kyrgyzstan's 'southern' clan, led by four Matraimov brothers and current president Sooronbay Jeenbekov, and the northern clan, most prominently represented by former president Atambayev and 'Republic' party leader Jooshbek Koyenaliyev (now appointed mayor of revolutionary Bishkek). All four parties that officially entered parliament represent more or less different groups in the 'southern' clan. At the same time, it should be remembered that geographically Bishkek is located in the northern part of the country.
Another important feature of Kyrgyzstan is the instability of power. Unlike, for example, neighboring Tajikistan, where President Emomali Rahmon has been in power since prehistoric times, in Kyrgyzstan this is the third revolutionary change of power. This means that it has not been possible to create a stable monolith of power structures that are infinitely loyal to authority. Every militia colonel realizes that it is unknown who will be in power tomorrow, so it is better not to overdo the smothering of protests. Suddenly, it may turn out that the one that was choked in the evening, has already become an authority by morning. That is why the resistance to the energetic actions of the protesters was so weak.
As the situation in Kyrgyzstan can change by 180 degrees at any time, it is not possible to say for sure what it is right now. However, power appears to have passed into the hands of the opposition Coordinating Council, led by Adahan Madumarov, chairman of the opposition party "United Kyrgyzstan". This council has already formed an interim government that will run until new elections. According to information sources, there is a general power vacuum in the country, which is used by various elements to rob or engage in vandalism. President Jeenbekov disappeared the unrest during and for some time after, but now stressed in an interview with the BBC's Kyrgyzstan edition that he is still a legitimate president who would try to reconcile all parties. It should be noted that the "revolution" in Kyrgyzstan is still relatively peaceful - only one person has been officially confirmed deceased and all parties have confirmed their readiness to negotiate.
Whatever the end of this revolution, it is safe to say that it will hardly change the lives of the people of Kyrgyzstan. Although there, as in Latvia and elsewhere in the world, the change of power is rationalized as being based on the interests of ordinary people and the fight against corruption, hardly anyone outside Kyrgyzstan seriously thinks that this country will suddenly become the Denmark of Central Asia or even Slovenia. This moment must also be remembered more often in our country, when another candidate promising the sun, the moon, and the stars appears before the elections.
Regarding the question posed in the title, whether the Kyrgyzstan scenario could be repeated in Belarus, most experts say that no, it couldn’t. The main argument is that there are no oligarchic clans in Belarus who would be interested in the change of power, therefore there is no division of the power elite. The power structures have been fed and trained for so long that they are ready to pierce the throat of anyone who dares to stand against the 'owner' like a loyal dog would. Consequently, any use of force by the protesters would provoke a very sharp, even bloody retaliation, which the "siloviki" could successfully sell to the public. Look, these terrorists are attacking state institutions, prisons, so the chaos and 'violence' must be stopped so that it does not get worse. That is why it is important for Lukashenko's opponents to maintain a moral advantage by protesting resolutely peacefully, without offending anyone. Only by maintaining this moral superiority can they hope for more and more public support, because the power has nothing positive to oppose this with, except rubber sticks and water jets.
However, there is one small but significant difference. If ten thousand people protested in Bishkek at best (judging by the video stories the real number could be much smaller), then in Belarus on August 16 in Minsk alone there were about 300,000 on the streets, and a large number of protesters were also present in other cities. The power was completely confused and did not know what to do. On this day, the Belarusian people could have done whatever they wanted, and everything would have gone smooth as butter. However, the opportunity was missed, and in the following days the dictator recovered and managed to stabilize the situation.
Of course, this does not mean that Lukashenko will be able to continue to rule peacefully as before. His situation is very precarious and restrictive, as his legitimacy is very weak. Any shock, both internal and external, can prove fatal to the regime, and everyone understands that. Therefore, now that the one-off moment has indeed been missed, it is up to Belarus's protest leaders to gain political weight and, while continuing peaceful civil disobedience activities, to wait for "the corpse of the enemy to swim past in the river."