The chess game around Suwalki. It’s now NATO’s turn

This week's NATO meeting in Madrid will take place against the backdrop of a new, as yet unmilitary, escalation. At the epicenter of the conflict is the Suwalki corridor, or the Suwalki gap as it is also known. The gap is in Russia's area of interest. It is a 100-kilometre strip separating the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is armed to the teeth, from Russia's ally Belarus. On one side is Lithuania, on the other Poland. If Russia is the first to block those 100 kilometers from both sides, then NATO access and the Article 5 land aid promised to all the Baltic States is cut off.

At the NATO meeting on June 29-30, this will be the main issue on the agenda - whether and how to defend the alliance's eastern flank from a potential aggressor - and the escalation in Suwalki makes it clear why. There is one highway and one railway line that supply Kaliningrad by land. With the new sanctions, Lithuania has fulfilled its obligation as an EU Member State and has partially restricted the flow of certain goods. These include the supply of metal products, cement and alcohol - key items that power the Russian military machine and its maintenance personnel in Kaliningrad. And while in the Baltic countries most people, including politicians, sat around Midsummer bonfires, ate grilled meat and drank beer during the long festive holidays, in Russia anger was growing. The Kremlin is furious, threatening as yet unnamed retaliatory measures, while Belarus, as usual, is chiming in - Lithuania's actions amount to a declaration of war.

The new old plans

In the chess game around Suwalki, the next move is now expected to be on the NATO side. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, already in the first month of the Ukrainian war, said what kind of action the Baltics expect from NATO members: "We want the Suwalki gap to be defended from both sides. We want [NATO] to be properly prepared for a possible cut-off of the Suwalki gap from both sides." And this protection must be guaranteed in the new NATO concept and the subordinate Baltic defense plans. The old concept, which will remain in force for a few more days, defines Russia as a cooperation partner. In the new document, Russia will be called the aggressor, but the content of the new defense plans also raises concerns from the point of view of the interests of the Baltic States and Poland, because it may turn out that they are in fact the old plans in a slightly tweaked version. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas has made it publicly known in the major international media that what is at stake is a restatement of the existing defense plans, which, in the event of a partial or total occupation of the Baltic States, provide for the retaking of the occupied territories. First, there would be 90 days of preparation for this, mobilization of forces, and then another 90 days for the actual operation. For the first three months, we would therefore have to rely essentially on our own forces, and the example of Ukraine makes it easy to imagine the devastating consequences of waging war on such a limited territory.

Kallas’ warning

"Estonia would be wiped off the map and Tallinn's Old Town completely destroyed under NATO's current plans to defend the country from a Russian attack. If you compare the sizes of Ukraine and the Baltic countries, it would mean the complete destruction of countries and our culture," so outspoken was the Estonian Prime Minister in her public remarks. One can only hope that such a communication strategy ahead of the NATO meeting is part of military diplomacy to put pressure on the big member states. Latvian politicians are not painting such a dramatic picture, at least until the summit. "We are working to ensure that NATO's plans provide for the full protection of our border and that it is impossible for an aggressor to cross it." So says Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks. So the war should be fought on the aggressor's territory, not after it has already entered, for example to take the Suwalki corridor, so important for supplying Kaliningrad. The Baltic States must now exert maximum pressure these days so that, in the event of an attack, condemnation in the most resolute form is not NATO's main weapon for the immediate defense of the Baltics. The policy of deterrence must be replaced by a policy of defense. As stated in the request of the Baltic States, there needs to be at least a division in each country with a permanent command center, and above all, the skies must be protected.

The coming days will show to what extent NATO's slogan "one for all and all for one" could be considered a reality.