The agreement between US President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Nordstream-2 can be described in various loud words: both as a betrayal of Ukraine, which is fighting Russian aggression alone, and as a sensible policy that will bring Russia-West relations out of the deep and protracted crisis and will form a new alliance in the fight against the Eastern dragon - China.
The assessment of this Biden-Merkel pact depends almost entirely on the optics through which it is viewed. If Putin's Russia is considered to be the main threat to the world, then the assessment is one, but if greater danger is seen from the rapidly growing power of communist China, then it is another.
The construction of the Nordstream-2 has long since turned from an economic project into a political problem (similar to how Covid questions turned from epidemiological to quasi-religious). Of course, the project retains an important economic component, but its function as a political gesture has become much more important. What gestures am I talking about?
First and foremost, a testament to Biden's promise to "return to Europe" and restore the transatlantic unity that was shattered by Trump. Let us remember that Trump described Germany's stinginess in military spending as Germans encumbering the Americans and threatened to withdraw US military bases from Germany. Now Biden can say, "I’ve come back." The question is: does a conditional settlement with Germany mean a settlement with the rest of Europe? Especially with the Europe that once experienced on its own skin the occupation or semi-occupation by Russia (USSR). Meaning, Eastern Europe. Poland has already told the Americans and the Germans everything they think about them in a joint statement with Ukraine. Removing the diplomatic veil, the message is simple - traitors!
Of course, it can be said that
neither the German nor the US leaders have sworn an oath to ensure the peace of mind of the people of Poland, the Baltic States or even less of Ukraine. They have taken an oath to think about the citizens of their countries and their interests,
but these supposedly rational arguments do not really work, because international politics are very complex, difficult to balance and often unpredictable. You never know what results each particular agreement will lead to. Especially a separate agreement behind the backs of other countries. There was the classic case with the Munich Agreement of 1938, which the Prime Minister of England Neville Chamberlain and the Prime Minister of France Édouard Daladier tried to call a peace agreement, but Winston Churchill described (as it soon turned out) much more aptly: “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war.” Not to mention the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
At the moment, no one can say what the long-term consequences of the Biden-Merkel Pact will be. However, we can consider the reasons why the parties went for it. It is clear that neither the experienced Merkel nor Biden has a special sympathy or even minimal illusions about Putin, his policies, goals and the person as such. Nor do I think that Putin has interested these two politicians in any way, like Gerhard Schröder, François Fillon, Thomas Bach, Sepp Blatter, and many others around the world (I would not be so sure in the case of Macron). So the goal of stopping the stalemate around the pipeline and handing Putin an olive branch is based on political rationalism. But what kind?
In Merkel's case, the already mentioned economic component plays an important role, as does the desire to show Washington that Germany is still a sovereign state and can form relations with third countries as it wishes. Of course, while respecting the interests of others. However, in this case, the total reluctance of Western European politicians and societies to confront societies unlike themselves played an important role. They are ready to fight to the last with internal opponents, but feel sharp discomfort from confrontation with incomprehensible, unpredictable opponents. Neither Germany nor France wants any issues with Putin's Russia. Both countries have long seen the role of mediators in the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a cumbersome burden, as the conflict is protracted and there is no end in sight. Not only is there no end in sight, but moreover, you can't see any positive movement at all. This applies not only to the Russia-Ukraine issue, but also, more broadly, to the issue of Russia-West and Russia-Western Europe relations.
In this situation, politicians often turn on the at times well-functioning stand-by mode. Respectively, avoiding any sharp actions, hoping that the problem itself will somehow "be absorbed". If we look at Merkel's Eastern policy, we see that it is aimed at not inciting Putin and trying to involve him in games (as one would do in fun parties with gloomy people sitting in the corner). The most obvious example is the proposal by Merkel and Macron on June 26 to invite the President of Russia to the EU summit. Merkel's strategy is simple - no matter how long Putin sits in the Kremlin, he will leave someday. And the world has to somehow last until that moment, and then there will be other politicians who will form a different policy with the new Russia.
Biden's strategy is similar, but the Chinese factor plays a much more important role in it. If Latvian politicians are accused of thinking in terms of Excel spreadsheet tables, then US politicians are accustomed to thinking in terms of curves in a graph. These curves show them an unattractive picture: in the coming years, the United States will lose the status of the world's largest economy and China will surpass it. In addition, the further these graphs are drawn, the more disturbing the picture. Thus, in the eyes of the United States, the "real" opponent is China. How to neutralize this opponent?
When Biden entered politics, the authority in U.S. diplomacy was Nixon's time U.S. Secretary of State, now 98-year-old Henry Kissinger. In the heat of the Cold War, when the United States was stuck in Vietnam and the USSR violently subdued the Prague Spring, he began talks with Mao Zedong's China and secretly arrived in Beijing in 1971 to get communist China on its side in the fight against the communist USSR. Biden, in a meeting with Putin in Geneva on June 16 this year, was very likely hoping for something similar. I emphasize something similar, because the historical parallels here are blurred.
The main idea that Biden handed over to Putin (of course, not in such words) could be this: Vladimir, we have different views on many things in the world, but at the moment the biggest enemy for both of us is not each other, but the people sitting in Beijing. They will double-cross you sooner or later. They can be trusted much less than us. That is why we should agree - do what you want, but do not cross the line after which it will be difficult for me and other Western leaders to defend tolerance for your actions in Congress and in the media. If you follow this, we will not prevent you from sitting in the Kremlin as long as you want, we will help with finances and technology, we will not introduce any new sanctions, and we won't look too hard at the old enforcement of the old ones. Remember, there was once the Jackson-Vanik amendment. It did not prevent us from cooperating in all areas in the past. And the line that I ask you not to cross on behalf of the whole West is a military invasion of Ukraine.
Here, of course, it can be said that I would ascribe to Biden an unimaginable naivety that is not possible for a politician of such a level and experience. Admittedly, such an offer sounds naive, but could any other alternative offer have been made by Biden to Putin in Geneva if we know the follow-up to it - the Nordstream-2 agreement? Even purely theoretically?
Yes, Biden could have been demonstratively sharp, cold and menacing against Putin. And? Would such a position improve the global security climate? Maybe it would. Many who know the Russian mentality think so, but in order to express and, above all, fully endure such a position, you must also have a corresponding mentality. You have to be extremely confident about yourself and your strength to talk to people like Putin from positions of strength. Does Biden have such strength and conviction? Well...? I don't know.
But if there is no strength (I'm not talking about the objective economic and military potential), then it's better not to jump into a fight or even threaten with it. Better try to talk to everyone. Biden is trying to do just that. We will see the results of these attempts in the near future, and then we will be able to talk about the effectiveness of this strategy.