LIIA director Andris Sprūds: Putin's big, ambitious dream is the non-existence of NATO

The meeting between US and Russian Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin is scheduled for Wednesday, June 16 in Geneva. A discussion with the Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and Professor at Riga Stradins University Andris Sprūds, about the goals of this meeting, possible results and the impact of these talks on political processes in the world, including Latvia's security issues.

What is the purpose of this meeting, because many believe that this is a rather unusual meeting - it is not expected that any documents or agreements will be signed during it. There won't even be a joint press conference at the end of the meeting. Why did the parties decide to meet anyway?

The purpose and meaning of this meeting is to set up a face-to-face "red telephone" (a hotline for contacting in an emergency). Two politicians meet to mark the field on how to avoid escalation.

Do you support the version that this meeting is because of Biden's call to Putin on April 24 to prevent a large-scale war in Ukraine?

In my opinion, this call should not be seen as a gift to Putin to prevent war. The main motive, after all, was the awareness that such conflicts, which occasionally occur [in this case, the concentration of Russian forces at Ukraine's borders] must, by definition, be somehow stabilized. If we are talking about whether Biden has prevented war with this call, then I wish to start from the assumption that Putin had not planned any major war from the beginning. From Putin, this was heavy metal diplomacy to show that issues will not be resolved without Russia. In a way, he achieved his goals.

Putin achieved what is very important for Russia. Namely, that Russia and Putin are perceived as equals. This issue of status and prestige is no less important than real things in real life. He has achieved this by blackmailing with the possibility of war.

At the same time, it does not seem to me that Russia is now ready to go occupy Kyiv. In 2014, it had a much better chance of doing so than now, when the Ukrainian army has been mobilized and is much more prepared for serious resistance. The fact that Russia will not allow any change in Eastern Ukraine without its consent is quite clear, and this concentration of the army was a clear hint that it would put it to use at the slightest Ukrainian activity, but I do not think there was a planned interstate conflict with the occupation of Kyiv as the end-goal.

From what you have said, we can consider this situation being like in that game where two cars are driving at full speed towards each other, thinking of who will be the first to turn the wheel and swerve.

Yes, this is called a game of chicken. Who will be the first to chicken out.

Seems that Biden chickened out first. Say what you want, but it looks like Putin won.

If we have to count in these 1:0 categories, then yes. Putin achieved what he wanted. He has become an equal. You can't do without Russia. He was approached to prevent the escalation. However, I do not consider Biden a loser. He has said some very harsh words against Putin. The fact that he called Putin a murderer or, to be more precise, agreed to a statement in the form of a question, does not allow Biden's opponents to accuse him of weakness or concessions to Putin.

The meeting will take place in Geneva, at the same hotel where Reagan met Gorbachev in November 1985. But that is also where the similarities end, because at that time Gorbachev was interested in ending the tension in mutual relations. Now there is no indication that Putin wants to change anything significantly. This conflict situation allows him to maintain the feeling of a "besieged fortress" and to write off all domestic political difficulties at its expense. What can Biden hope for in this situation? It is clear that Russian propagandists, led by Solovyov, will try to prove one louder than the other that Putin has won over Biden, but what needs to happen for everyone to say to Biden after his return to Washington that he did a good job?

I fully agree that this issue is relevant and topical. How will Biden present this meeting? With Putin, everything is clear. Biden's call itself, the invitation and the meeting itself are a great diplomatic, if not a victory, then it can be turned into such. See, how Putin is counted on. As for historical parallels, some compare 2021 to 1981, when Reagan became president of the United States and the USSR invaded Afghanistan (now it is Ukraine). At the time, there was also the issue of transatlantic unity, as Europeans were building a gas pipeline with the USSR (now it is Nordstream). At that time, Reagan did not have any meeting with Brezhnev. If Biden could gain some advantages, then only in those areas that Putin himself had constructed. I am thinking of these cyber-attacks, which Biden could and will certainly show huge dissatisfaction with. Here, Putin could show a gesture of goodwill and promise to "take care" of it so that attacks of this magnitude do not happen again. Tactics are used here - certain activities are constructed before the meeting itself and “friendly help” is offered during the negotiations to prevent these activities. However, we should not exaggerate Biden's need for a positive result, because if Trump, Obama, Bush, Bill Clinton started relations with Russia with a restart, and they had to get something in return, then Biden does not start with a restart. So he doesn't have to bring anything back at all costs.

How can Biden react if Putin is stubborn in his face-to-face talks and makes it clear that "yes, our GDP is only 1.5% of world GDP and our economic potential is 20 times less than the total potential of NATO countries, but so what? We have 10,000 or 12,000 nuclear warheads, and if anything, my hand will not hesitate to press that button." Does Biden have anything to trade with Putin, so to say? What are these things he could trade?

If I had to define a psychological portrait of Putin, then I would say he has his instincts, reflexes and his pride. It is an emotional base that is not always fully predictable. He himself has admitted that he is guided by the principle that if you have to fight, then you must throw the first punch. It is this emotional part that is difficult to understand on a rational basis. On the other hand, he reflects the expectations that exist in Russian society and deliberately plays with those expectations. One of the strongest expectations is - they may not even respect you, but they must be afraid of you.

When evaluating Putin's actions and his motivation, there is no consensus among observers on Putin's mental stability and realistic worldview. What is your opinion on this issue?

I stick to the realization that Putin's aggressive brazenness is a bit exaggerated. There are these elements of the game of chicken, playing an unstable, unpredictable player is part of the strategy in this game. It is rational to portray yourself as crazy in the game of chicken. Show that you couldn't swerve the car even if you wanted to - that you've tied your own hands, that you're a little crazy, fallen in the back seat.

So, do you think that the concern that Putin has lost some of his mental stability is not really justified, because he is more likely just acting like he's unstable?

It is part of his toolset. The deployment of forces at Ukraine's borders was also determined by this interpretation. I don't think he was ready to go to war. He just showed that if you want to go to war, I'm ready for it. That doesn't mean he's planning a war. This means that he is ready for war, and I do not rule out that this may happen at some coincidence, but that was not the original goal. If that had been the original goal, he would have achieved it. If we call the elements of game theory, then there is also the so-called prisoner's dilemma, which states that conflict brings benefits in the short term, but in the long run it is more advantageous to speak the same language and find cooperation opportunities, because we are prisoners of the situation. Where to find the same language in this case? The range of issues is wide enough. Let's start by saying that one will be able to say that he has told the other to their face that "you can't do that and we will not allow it", but the other will say "see, we are considered equals" and both will be politically emotionally satisfied. I think there will be some sort of minimum program: the work of the ambassadors will be restored, because the ambassadors have now been recalled, and there will be an improvement in consular relations. Finding the same language will be the easiest at the bureaucratic level and it will be found. We will continue to talk about arms control, the Iranian nuclear deal and what will happen after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on September 11. Progress is possible on these issues. There are fields where interests overlap and there is no need to confront at all costs, as it was during the Cold War when there was a zero-sum game all over the field. Now it is not like that anymore. The red lines with elements of pride and instability on both sides are the post-Soviet space, especially Ukraine and Belarus. In the case of Belarus, nothing can be influenced from the sidelines, and Putin will not allow it. What will happen in Belarus and who will rule there, Putin thinks he will determine that. There will be no concessions.

Theoretically, given the US influence on the rest of the world's banking system, the US could make life very difficult for Lukashenko and his clique. Of course, if they wanted to. But will the issue of Belarus be addressed at all, and will it be a thing to trade for?

I do not think that Belarus will be a thing to trade for Putin. The only thing Putin could trade or pretend to trade is that he can secure the transit of power and some kind of Lukashenko's departure, but that's all. In the current situation, it would even be too idealistic to expect Putin to be content with maintaining the status quo. The current situation in Belarus is so favorable to Putin that it is hard to imagine that he would not want to gain even more influence from it.

Are you talking about a possible Anschluss?

I am talking about a de facto Anschluss in certain areas. I am not talking about a de jure Anschluss of the state. By that, I mean a single tax system, a single currency, and I would not rule out the annexation or Anschluss of defense and security. In the case of Belarus, Putin is not satisfied with the status quo, so starting discussions with the Americans on some kind of joint agreement would be a sign of weakness in Putin's eyes. Another thing - Ukraine, and there will be a discussion about that. The Ukrainian presidential administration reported that President Zelensky had talked to Biden, who allegedly agreed with Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and supported the idea of ​​granting Ukraine a NATO membership action plan. The Biden administration denied reaching such an agreement. It was about supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity against Russian aggression, but it was not about granting a NATO action plan. Following this statement by Washington, the administration of the President of Ukraine also adjusted its statement. The desire Zelensky expressed to meet with Biden before his meeting with Putin anywhere in the world has not materialized. As a result, Biden seemingly recognizes Putin's "red line" - Ukraine is not currently able to make a more concrete move towards NATO, while Biden's position is "in turn, you, Russia, do not lead troops in.”

So it is proposed to maintain the status quo in this sector?

Basically, yes. It can even be considered that Putin, with the concentration of his forces on the Ukrainian border, also basically said it - if you do not want the status quo, then you can get the status quo with a minus. I think it's a very rational move. Returning to the talks in Geneva, there will be two more things where interesting dynamics are possible. One thing is energy, climate and the climate tax that could emerge. I am not saying that there will be any tangible results in this area, but it is clear that Biden will go for it, and in the future, these changes in energy policy may have a significant impact on Russia as a hydrocarbon power. The second issue that has come to the fore recently is cybersecurity. Here, I think each party has done some homework before these talks. Cybersecurity is one of the Biden administration's priorities, and it has made it clear [through various leaks in the US media] that

Putin will be given a very strong signal to stop Russian cyber-attacks. Possible objections that Russia cannot fully control private activities will be ignored, and it is cyber issues that will be the litmus test for the outcome of these talks.

If in the next six months we do not see the kind of cyber-attacks we have just seen, then this meeting will have had positive results. Russia has every opportunity to carry out even more serious, massive cyber-attacks (of course, the United States has no less resources), and what will happen next will allow us to judge the direction of further relations.

These are all important issues, but they are also tactical issues. The most important question is a different one: what is Putin's strategic goal, because it's hard to imagine that he's just thinking about how to sit still in the Kremlin by 2036 or longer. To believe that Putin's main goal is so down to earth would be to underestimate the seriousness of the situation.

If we look more broadly, Putin's big, ambitious dream would be the non-existence of NATO. If Putin were to succeed in achieving this, then he could consider it the greatest achievement of his life. Demonstrate NATO's de facto inability to act in a crisis situation.

The meaning of NATO's inability to act in the interpretation of Professor Sprūds and what it could mean for Latvia will be discussed in the next issue of Neatkarīgā.