Now that the war in Ukraine has been going on for five months and there is no sign of an end in the near future, one must try to understand how Putin plans to win this war, because objectively Russia's stand against the rest of the world, which supports Ukraine, is rather hopeless.
When Russian dictator Vladimir Putin claimed in an interview with The Financial Times on June 27, 2019, that Western liberal democracy was in deep crisis, was outdated and would soon disappear from the global stage, most commentators judged his vision of the situation to be inadequate to reality. One that only confirms Putin's own irredeemable backwardness. There was no point in even examining these absurd conclusions, was the general conclusion.
Now, however, it seems time to take another look at Putin's position, because this is precisely what the strategic plan of the Russian political class is based on. It has been promoted for years as Russia's “national ideology” by his closest associate, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council.
The cornerstone of this ideology is simple: the price of human life is so high in the West that war there is seen as something unthinkable. Intolerable. Not like in Russia, where war has been talked about as a desirable and even expected event on all propaganda channels for a decade. Putin's thesis is repeated endlessly day and night in different variations - what is the world worth if there is no Russia in it? It is what it is and what we want it to be, not what others want it to be. In other words, if the world does not allow us to do as we please, then there is no place on earth for such a world, and we won’t be too scared to blow it up. But it probably will allow us.
Although there are great doubts about this “not being scared” and the plan itself has a low probability of happening, it must be admitted that this probability is greater than zero, and it is this small but in Putin/Patrushev's imagination sufficiently large probability that all Russia's shameless actions and rhetoric are based. What is the main idea of this strategic plan?
The initial indications are clearly unfavorable to Russia. The West accounts for a third of the world's total economy, and Russia, with less than 2% of world GDP, is not and cannot be a competitor, let alone an adversary. In a direct confrontation, Russia cannot defeat the West economically, militarily or politically. In a confrontation with the West, Russia has no chance.
It was precisely on the basis of this undeniable fact that most experts in the world (both in Russia and in the West) considered a Russian invasion of Ukraine unlikely. Putin would not be such a fool as to challenge the rest of the world, experts said. But it turned out that he was. What was he hoping for?
There is now no doubt that Putin was hoping for a rapid collapse of the Ukrainian state and military governance, the running away of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the completion of the "special military operation" in a few weeks' time. Then, when the plan failed and events began to take an unforeseen course, Putin looked strange for a moment. Let us recall his conversation with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on April 21, with his fingers feverishly gripping the edge of the table; and Putin's seated, hunched posture at the May 9 parade, with a blanket over his legs. In both cases, he made a pathetic impression. Rumors of Putin's health problems circulated, but by June he was visibly on the mend. What changed?
In May, US arms deliveries to Ukraine stopped almost completely for a time. Various Kissingers, Macrons and Scholzes started talking about the need to let Putin save face, and the so-called Italian peace plan emerged, which envisaged territorial concessions by Ukraine in exchange for peace. Russia would keep the part of Ukraine it already occupied, while Ukraine would retain its independence throughout the rest of its territory.
At the beginning of June, the gradual implementation of this plan began in the collective consciousness of the Western European political class. The rationale for the plan was seemingly self-evident: all wars end with an agreement at some point. This war will be no exception, so various options must be considered now. Ukraine's categorical rejection of this plan and the visit of the French, German and Italian (+Romanian) leaders to the war-affected areas near Kyiv on June 16 completely stopped this “peace plan”, although for how long is unknown.
Whereas Putin initially thought that no far-reaching plan would be needed and that a short-term, tactical plan would suffice, when it turned out that nothing went as planned, Putin experienced the confusion already mentioned. Now Putin has managed to regain his former confidence, which suggests that he has a new plan.
On May 24, Argumenti i Fakti newspaper published an interview with Patrushev, Putin's closest associate, in which he included his earlier theses in today's reality: “Truth is on our side. All our goals in Ukraine will be 100% realized. We are in no hurry." The interview was full of various conspiracy theories. From the mystical "Anglo-Saxons" who have for centuries harbored dreams of neutralizing Russian "might"; the "golden billion" who want to impose their domination on the rest of the world, to the invocation of the Clintons, Rockefellers and Soros foundations.
It is starting to look as if Patrushev has succeeded in convincing Putin: the truth is on our side. We are in no hurry, because we - Russia, not the West - are on the right side of history. This conviction is based on the old Dostoyevsky and other Slavophiles' idea of the weakness of the West. On the assumption that the West is not prepared to pay for its values with human lives, and that values for which nobody sacrifices their lives are worth nothing at all. They are only false, imaginary values that do not stand the test of blood and time.
Putin set out a similar worldview in the aforementioned 2019 interview with the Financial Times. At the time, Western observers did not even consider it necessary to discuss Putin's remarks (as they were clearly inadequate). Now Putin proposes to return to this "theoretical" discussion, now already in practice. He is implicitly calling for a decisive struggle for values in real life, in real-time.
The West is put in a rather tricky situation here, which is what Putin is playing on. The West cannot and does not try to hide the fact that it does not want to get involved in any real "war of values" with Russia. Limited arms supplies to Ukraine, financial aid and economic pressure on Russia are the most they are prepared to go for, and even that with gritted teeth. Inflation, high fuel prices and the threat of recession are the nasty things that can sweep more than one Western government into irrelevance.
The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, is calling on Europeans to bear the consequences of the sanctions imposed on Russia at home and to expect them to have an impact on the Russian economy: "We have no choice. To allow Russia to prevail would be to allow it to destroy our democracy and the foundations of an international order based on the rule of law."
If someone, such as the well-known Russian oppositionist and associate of Alexei Navalny, Leonid Volkov, thinks that Putin is rushing to conclude a ceasefire as quickly as possible, I would remind him that Putin has always stressed the opposite: that while Western politicians come and go, he has eternity at his disposal. As Patrushev says, we are in no hurry (Мы не гонимся за сроками).
The possibility that this war could be stopped in some kind of stalemate seems to many in the West a tempting but historically impossible prospect. Sooner or later there must be some final resolution. A final resolution, not a temporary resolution for a few years. Most likely, this resolution must end with the defeat of Russia, because objectively the West is much stronger. There is only one option in which the West loses and Putin wins. If the West really turns out to be as cowardly and powerless as Putin, Patrushev and the entire Russian propaganda machine are making it out to be in their fantasies.
The task of the Latvian political class is to remind Western politicians and Western public opinion in all possible places that there can be no compromise here. Concessions only increase Putin's confidence that pressure must be stepped up and that victory will be in his hands soon, so very soon. If the West bows, then with this bowing all the values that the West has hitherto held aloft as a banner will disappear. In their place will come the values of Putin/Patrushev. Either one or the other. The choice is the West's to make.