The outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the goals and demands set by Vladimir Putin make it clear that many seemingly unrelated events were part of Putin's plan to rebuild the Russian empire in the former USSR territory.
By going to war in February 2022, Putin appears to be seeking revenge for a failed attempt to subjugate Ukraine in 2014, at a time when the Ukrainian capital was the scene of fighting between forces loyal to pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and pro-European protesters. In spring 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, but the annexation of Crimea was not the Russian leader's ultimate goal. The idea was to bring most, if not all, of Ukraine under Russian control, using pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian Parliament, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian power structures. But the public backlash against the rapprochement with Russia initiated by Yanukovych was so widespread that it became clear to the Kremlin's master that Ukraine's return to Russia's sphere of influence would not happen peacefully. In early 2014, the Russian military developed several options for subjugating Ukraine.
Some Russian government ministers proposed military intervention in Ukraine. The scenario for military intervention was roughly as follows. In order to "legalize" the military intervention, President Yanukovych, loyal to Russia, together with pro-Russian ministers and members of the Rada, the Parliament, had to leave the rebellious city of Kyiv for an alternative center of power in an eastern Ukrainian city such as Kharkiv, where members of the Parliament, together with President Yanukovych, would set up an alternative center of power. These people would declare themselves to be the only legitimate representatives of Ukraine and would ask Russia for military assistance in the fight against the "terrorists" or otherwise named opponents of the coup.
Ideally, the Russian army would seek to take control of the whole of Ukraine. One option, in the event of a failure to take control of the whole country, was to partition Ukraine, separating the pro-Ukrainian north-west (Lviv and several other Ukrainian regions) from the rest of Ukraine. The central, southern and eastern parts of Ukraine would in turn come under Russian control.
Why was such a plan not implemented in 2014? First of all, the Maidan protesters, having been informed that such a plan was being prepared, prevented the pro-Russian members of the Ukrainian Rada from leaving Kyiv. The suspicious Rada members were blocked, monitored and closely guarded. Only Yanukovych managed to escape from Kyiv. Secondly, the majority of the Russian people at that time was against any war, and even more so against a war with a "brother nation". Both then and now, one in three Russians has roots in Ukraine at the level of at least one grandparent. The entry of the Russian army into Ukraine could have caused mass discontent and threatened the foundations of Putin's power. That is why Putin did not agree to the open entry of the Russian army into Ukraine in 2014. The decision was taken to annex Crimea and to cut off the most economically important region of Ukraine, Donetsk. In order to launch the invasion, public opinion had to change. Therefore, the involvement of the Russian army in both Crimea during the annexation and in Donetsk was carefully concealed, even from Russia. Meanwhile, all the TV channels had to launch a massive ideological campaign that Ukraine was a failed state with fascists in power and appalling corruption. This went on for eight years. The plan to subjugate Ukraine was shelved rather than cancelled. In eight years, public attitudes towards Ukraine were changed, so that in 2022 Putin could go to war without fear of the majority of the public turning against him, while the minority are being intimidated with harsh criminal punishments.
But you cannot step into the same river twice. The USSR was able to conquer half of Europe because the Communist Party used an altruistic ideology of creating a fairer society, which many people believed in. They believed that they were prepared to sacrifice their lives for this ideology. Today, in 2022, Vladimir Putin does not have such a society-uniting ideology, for which everyone is prepared to die or be crippled for life. Consequently, this one dictator's obsessive desire to take back the USSR empire's lost territories, arms in hand, will clash with the unwillingness of the majority of the Russian people to sacrifice their lives for such a cause.