LIIA Director Andris Sprūds on the configuration of the world after the war: We are entering a world in which there will be asymmetric but nevertheless multiple centers of power

A conversation with Andris Sprūds, Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs at Riga Stradiņš University.

It may be premature to make any predictions after two weeks of hostilities, but still - what would they be for this year and beyond?

It is not so easy to make predictions now. Especially because events are moving extremely fast and we are still in that emotionally tragic and dramatic moment. I would like to hope for the best. Ukraine is showing its fighting spirit and putting the big bear in its place, but we cannot rule out the worst-case scenario that, despite all the negotiations and the imitation of negotiations, some Ukrainian territory could be occupied.

So, is the fact that some part of Ukraine would be occupied, in your opinion, the worst-case scenario?

I would say yes. If we are talking about some wider escalation or a complete loss of Ukrainian statehood, then that cannot be ruled out, but I still think that I... I would not like to outline the very worst possible scenarios. There is an emotionally subjective element to this outlining of scenarios. Now, in the course of the war, predictions are already appearing that the whole territory of Ukraine could be occupied and that Ukraine could lose its statehood. Putin has also threatened Macron with this possibility if Ukraine does not make concessions. But the failures of the Russian military machine are pushing Putin to negotiate. This threat that if Ukraine does not make concessions, it may lose everything, that is to say, its statehood, shows that Putin is aware of the limits of his abilities. More broadly, it is now clear that we are in a protracted cold war conflict. If before there was the idea of some kind of selective cold war, now it is no longer selective. We are now on completely different fronts in terms of our understanding of both the domestic political environment and how we perceive the external environment. In the long term, we could be optimistic that at some point such competition, tension and pressure, both external and internal, may not be withstood by Putin's system, but I would be quite cautious about such an optimistic scenario as well. In summary, I would be cautious about the most pessimistic scenarios in the short term, but also cautious about the most optimistic scenarios in the long term.

What will be the configuration of the world [after the war]?

The configuration of the world will be such that we are entering a world in which there will be asymmetric but nevertheless multiple centers of power. At least for the time being, the winner is China, which has not gotten its hands dirty by directly supporting Russia. On the contrary, it is showing certain neutrality by its abstention, and it is showing that it has no geopolitical "love affair" with Russia. At the moment, we see three centers. Russia has always wanted it that way. If it could not get it in any other way, it has tried to get it violently. In this way, Russia has reminded its neighbors [outside NATO in the post-Soviet space] of itself, whose room for maneuver is limited, because the example of Ukraine shows that no one will come to their aid.

You said that we are on the eve of a new cold war. Does this mean that the bombing of the children's hospital in Mariupol with bombs that form craters several meters deep is a cold war?

What we are seeing now is absolutely not a cold war. It is a hot war, but it is not a hot war directly between the West and Russia.

You are basically presenting the mainstream view...

That is your interpretation. I am presenting my point of view.

Of course. I don't think for a moment that you are presenting a common view of the political class. It is just that your views, your style of thinking, coincide with the common, "normal", if you like, rational style of thinking. The only problem is that all the predictions of the mainstream so far, which said that Putin was just bluffing, there would be no war, it was not to his advantage, the whole Kremlin elite was partly living in the West, they were having their holidays there, they were having medical treatment there, their children and grandchildren were studying there, they have been proved wrong. Because Putin's way of thinking is radically different. From the point of view of normal people - deviant. Perhaps future forecasts should therefore be revised in the light of this deviation?

I partly agree and partly disagree. I agree that this emotional part was not sufficiently assessed. It was rationalized. If we continue to analyze and evaluate this part, we may not get anywhere, because we can shoot and sometimes we hit the target, sometimes not. That does not mean that by rationalization we arrive at something else. We missed the target before as well. I absolutely agree with you there. I can admit self-critically that I thought it was possible there would be a conflict, missile strikes, a war in the Donbas with some kind of activity, but I ruled out tanks on the streets of Kyiv. I thought that the shadows that came from Grozny [the bombing and destruction] would play a role. We came from the logic that Putin would rationalize the consequences of his actions in his calculations. Our mistake was that Putin did not rationalize these consequences.

Here, I think, is where the characteristic "analysts' error" comes in. That is, to put your own head on Putin's torso. Putin's actions are very easy to rationalize if we understand his objective: revenge for the USSR's loss to the West in the Cold War. Resentment for this humiliation (in Putin's mind), and a reassessment of the reality that has existed in the world since the 1990s.

I repeat that I do not rule out that Putin may go further and occupy the whole of Ukraine...

This is not about Ukraine. By occupying Ukraine, the West is not being humiliated and the world order is not being outplayed. Do you really think he will settle for Ukraine? Conquer Ukraine and then we can live peacefully behind the Iron Curtain with all these economic problems that are not going anywhere?

So what are the alternatives? For the fact that he is implacable. Conventional, at least at first, warfare on NATO territory? Or tactical nuclear strikes on military sites that could be accused of somehow supporting Ukraine?

Apparently.

As things stand, I would be wary of ruling it out. The danger with Putin remains both if he wins and if he loses. The danger is in both cases. If he starts to lose, then the danger is even greater. Because Putin cannot afford to lose a war or a conflict. Finding a face-saving way out is not easy at the moment. He needs a face-saving way out for himself, out of a situation where none of his original plans have come to fruition. This emotion will only intensify. On the other hand, Ukraine and the Ukrainian people have finally proved their statehood not only to the West, but also to Putin. It is not a pseudo-state. That is not unimportant. Returning to these scenarios, we cannot rule out an intensification of escalation followed by de-escalation, which is a fairly common element of Russian doctrine. First escalate, then de-escalate [on more favorable terms for itself]. However, I would like to stress once again that, in the configuration that exists today, the Americans have also drawn very strict lines - what they will definitely not defend, and what they will definitely defend.

The question is often asked - why have they defined their plans so clearly? Wouldn't it be better to keep the opponent in the dark?

I agree. What Russia has been doing all along, keeping us guessing about what it will or will not do, puts us in a much more difficult situation. Even now, Russia is keeping us in strategic ambiguity. Whereas the West absolutely does not. From the very beginning, we should have left this window of strategic ambiguity open. It is good for us - we will not give away a millimeter [of NATO territory], while in the case of Ukraine - we will not directly support a millimeter. For us, this clarity is more reassuring than not having it.

This circle dance around Polish fighter jets, which cannot be handed over to the Ukrainian air force, demonstrates the West's indecisiveness, not to say cowardice, and almost provokes Putin into ever-sharper action. Putin can say: see, it's just as I said - as soon as I threatened with nukes they got cold feet and bowed down.

Yes and no. On the one hand, I agree that it may look like that, if that is what it looks like, but we do not fully know.

What do we not know? This is about something we can all see clearly.

We do not know exactly what happened to those Polish planes. I cannot rule out that there was an element of disagreement, but I cannot rule out that, at the moment when this decision was agreed and taken, the Russians gave some kind of warning and everything was shifted into reverse gear. We will find out some time later.

No. We do not need to know that at all. We already see that. What difference does it make if the Russians gave a warning? If now, every time the West wants to do something, it has to coordinate with the Kremlin and get Putin's approval, then Putin has already won the war and achieved his objectives. Now you in the West will dance to my tune.

Yes and no, because, of course, if there is no mutual accommodation or diplomacy, then there is only war. Somehow these red lines have been drawn. The challenge is that the West has drawn very clear red lines for itself. The positive thing is that this red line is to not give up even a centimeter of NATO territory, but on the other side - we are staying out of it [outside NATO]. Basically, not under any circumstances.

So the moral posture of the West at the moment is - Putin can completely wipe out Ukraine, we can only shrug helplessly.

Yes and no, again. Yes, in the sense that the moral dilemma is very simple - are we prepared to risk that a part of NATO territory is also wiped out? If we believe that war is inevitable, and we Latvia are next, then we [NATO] have to go into Ukraine. If, however, we think that it is not inevitable, then the question becomes what happens with further escalation, and we return to the topic that has already been discussed. These moral dilemmas - whether by sacrificing one civilian we are protecting other civilians - are there and will be there, but I remain of the opinion that war is not inevitable.

Thank you for this conversation, let us hope that in six months' time we can meet again for an interview under such similar conditions of relative peace.

I hope so, because it will mean that my prediction came true.

I also very, very much hope that your prediction will come true.